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INVESTMENT OF PROSECUTION RESOURCES IN CAREER CRIMINAL CASES
WILLIAM M. RHODES*
BACKGROUND
Justification for a career criminal program rests
on several basic assumptions: (1) that a small
number of offenders (habitual criminals) account
for a disproportionate amount of crime; if these
offenders were imprisoned, crime would be reduced
significantly; t (2) that habitual criminals are dis-
tinguishable from "routine" offenders who commit
fewer and less serious offenses; 2 (3) that once an
habitual offender is identified, his case can be
singled out for increased prosecutorial effort; and
(4) that this special handling will enhance the
probability of conviction and, perhaps also, the
length of prison time received by the convicted
offender.
3
* Senior Economist, Institute for Law and Social Re-
search.
'James Q. Wilson has been a major proponent of this
position. See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975);
Wilson & Boland, Crime, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT 179
(1976). Several researchers have shown that a small
number of offenders account for a disproportionate
amount of crime. See J. PETERSILIA, FOCUSING ATTENTION
ON CAREER CRIMINALS-AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME
(RAND P-6112, 1978); K. WILLIAMS, THE SCOPE AND
PREDICTION OF RECIDIVISM (INSLAW, PROMIS Re-
search Publication No. 10, 1979); M. WOLFGANG, R.
FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972). However, researchers have questioned how large
an impact the incarceration of offenders has on crime
rates. For an overview, see Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect
of Imprisonment: A Critical Review of the Literature, in DETER-
RENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 187 (1978).
2 But see K. WILLIAMS, note I supra; Dershowitz, The
Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions about Prediction, 23 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 24 (1971); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent
Criminal Behavior. A Methodological Critique and Prospectus, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EF-
FECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 244
(1978); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Pre-
ventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV.
717 (1972).
3 In general, seeJ. McMullin, The Development of the
Career Criminal Concept (Sept. 20-21, 1979) (workshop
paper, Career Criminal Conference, Alexandria, Va.).
For evaluations, see Chelimsky & Dahmann, The MITRE
Corporation's National Evaluation of the Career Criminal Pro-
gram: A Discussion of the Findings, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 102
(1980); Phillips & Cartwright, The California Criminal
Prosecution Program One Year Later, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 107
(1980).
The research reported in this paper initially
concentrates on the third premise that career crim-
inal units increase attorney time devoted to the
handling of habitual offenders. The findings were
drawn from a larger study deriving case weights
for the prosecution of adult felony cases in Los
Angeles County, California.4 In that study, case
weights were defined as the average amount of
attorney time spent on a criminal case, holding
constant the type of offense and disposition.
Weights were calculated independently for both
the career criminal unit and the routine caseload.
A summary of the methodology used in the Los
Angeles study is provided in the second section of
this paper. The third section of the paper presents
(1) case weights for the prosecution of career crim-
inal and noncareer criminal cases; (2) the distri-
bution of attorney time, broken down by the activ-
ity with which the attorneys were engaged, for
career criminal and noncareer criminal cases; and
(3) the distribution of attorney time over the life of
a typical case, both for career criminal and routine
cases. After this discussion of case weights and
attorney time distribution, the report discusses the
premise that career criminal units enhance the
probability of conviction of habitual offenders.
METHODOLOGY
To derive the case weights, it was necessary to
collect information on the amount of attorney time
spent on prosecution. It was anticipated that this
time should be categorized by the stage in the
criminal justice process that the case had reached
and what the attorney was doing while he worked
on the case. This information was collected in the
first set of data-the time data.
Daily time data were collected over a seventy-
three day period from all deputy district attorneys
who processed felony cases in the four branch
offices and the main office of the Los Angeles
County District Attorney. In addition, the study
distinguished cases handled by the career criminal
4 See W. Rhodes, R. Hildenbrand, J. Hausner & T.
Dungworth, Case Weights for the Prosecution and De-




A. District Attorney Case Weights: County-wide, Exclusive of the Special Prosecution
Units in Central Office
Dismiss Bench Jury
Guilty SOT
Case Type Mun. Ct. Sup. Ct. Plea Acquittal* Convict Acquittal Convict Acquittal
Robbery 181 556 530 474** 591** 535 2363 2307
Burglary 193 264 465 432 798 765 1447 1414
B. District Attorney Case Weights: Special Units
*SOT: Standing on the transcript.
**Fewer than 5 observations in at least one of the time slices.
***Zero observations in at least one of the time slices.
****Too few observations to estimate.
FIGURE 1
Deputy district attorney time and activity form (DA-A)
unit. Attorneys were instructed to fill out form DA-
A (shown in figure 1) daily.
Each deputy district attorney was asked to sup-
ply his name, a unique identification number, and
the date the form was completed. Deputies were
asked to supply the name of the case upon which
they were working and the complaint number of
that case. Together with the date and attorney
identification number, these data elements enabled
the matching of cases reported on the time form
with the second data base-case attributes stored
in the Prosecutor's Management Information Sys-
tem maintained by the office of the District Attor-
ney, Los Angeles County.
The second column of the form was used to
record case status, defined as the point in the
judicial proceeding reached by the case. Case status
number (1) was used if the attorney worked on
noncase-related matter. For other case-related mat-
ter, the status indicated whether the case was at
the precomplaint stage, (2); being presented to a
grand jury, (3); or in the process of being filed, (4).
Status (5) indicated that the case was in the. mu-
nicipal court, status (6) that it was in pretrial in
the superior court, and status (7) that it was at trial
in the superior court. Status (8) represented that
the case had reached probation and sentencing,
while status (9) indicated that a probation violation
hearing was being conducted. Status (10) indicated
that the case had reached an appellate court. Sta-
tuses (11) and (12) indicated that the attorney was
working on multiple cases.
The fourth column of the form was used to
record the attorney's activities, broadly defined to
include time spent on court appearances, confer-
ences, telephone calls, preparation, and other activ-
ities. These broad categories were subclassified into
forty-five narrowly defined subactivities that, to-
gether with the twelve status codes, provided 540
unique elements in a status-activity matrix, a sum-
mary of which is provided in the next section.
Case weights, that is the average time spent by
attorneys on criminal cases, were calculated. Be-
cause of the way data were collected, it was neces-
sary to develop a model to calculate these weights.
5
Using this model, the following steps were involved
in deriving these weights:
(a) Cases were selected only if the first charge was rob-
bery or burglary.
(b) Chronological time spent in municipal court was
divided into ten equal time "slices." The average
5Justification for this model can be found in W.
Rhodes & R. Hildenbrand, A Model for Estimating Case
Weights for the Prosecution of Felony Cases (Sept. 1979)
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern
Economic Ass'n, Atlanta, Ga.).
6 Chronological time means the time from filing to
preliminary hearing in the municipal court and the time
from superior court arraignment to trial.
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amount of attorney time spent in each slice was
calculated. These ten slices were then added to de-
termine the average time spent in municipal court.
(c) The above process was repeated for superior court.
Thus, it was possible to speak of the average time
spent both in municipal court and superior court.
(d) The average amount of attorney time spent on case
screening and sentencing was also determined.
(e) The above four times-the averages for case screen-
ing, municipal court, superior court, and sentenc-
ing-were summed separately for cases ending in
rejections, dismissals in municipal court, dismissals in
superior court, guilty pleas, bench trials, and jury
trials. These average times are reported in the next
section as case weights.
CASE WEIGHTS AND TIME DISTRIBUTION
How does the amount of attorney time spent on
the prosecution of habitual offenders compare with
the routine prosecution of criminal cases? Table 1
presents case weights for robbery and burglary
cases, two offenses of which the career criminal
unit in Los Angeles County handled a fairly large
volume. Because of the small number of cases
observed, table 1 reports a composite weight for
career criminal cases. It was possible to derive
distinct case weights for the routine prosecution of
robbery and burglary cases.
Regardless of the disposition, it is evident that
attorneys devoted more time to the cases of habit-
ual offenders processed through the career criminal
program than they did to the cases of other offend-
ers processed through regular prosecution. For ex-
ample, a guilty plea required about nine hours for
a routine robbery case and about eight hours for a
routine burglary. But for a career criminal case, a
guilty plea required nearly sixty hours. Jury trials
also were more expensive when prosecuted by the
career criminal unit. A routine robbery trial re-
quired about thirty-nine hours; a routine burglary,
about twenty-four hours. A career criminal case, in
contrast, required close to 185 hours. Overall, it
appears that conviction by the career criminal unit
demanded between five and seven times as many
attorney hours as did conviction through normal
prosecution.
Investigation revealed that career criminal attor-
neys spent more time on virtually every aspect of
prosecution-court appearances, conferences, tele-
phone calls, preparation, and other activities. How-
ever, the expanded amount of attorney time was
not proportional across each activity group.
First, career criminal attorneys appeared to
spend proportionally somewhat less time on court
appearances, 32% of total time compared with 30%
to 44% for the nonspecialized offices. They also
spent proportionally less time on administrative
and noncase-related activities, 9% relative to 9% to
14%. The implication is that specialized attorneys
spent proportionally somewhat more time on prep-
aration. Second, the division of this case prepara-
tion time was interesting. Special unit attorneys
spent a disproportionate amount of their confer-
ence and telephone time on witnesses, 43% for the
special unit and 12% to 31% for the nonspecialized
units. Recalling that career criminal attorneys
spent about five times as much effort per case as
their counterparts in nonspecialized units, it is
evident that witness contacts increased by a factor
of about ten for career criminal cases.
Police witnesses got somewhat less attention;
special unit prosecutors spent 16% of their confer-
ence and telephone time with police, relative to
21% to 29% for the rest of the office. These findings
may imply that "quality" prosecution relies less
upon police to build the case and more on the
input of witnesses and victims. This is not to say
that special unit prosecutors ignored police input.
On the contrary, because of the greater absolute
time spent on criminal cases by special unit prose-
cutors, even the smaller proportion of their time
accounted for more total police input into case
preparation. The point is that when attorneys have
a choice, they choose to invest more heavily in
increasing witness input into the case. There is
likely to be a lesson in this "revealed preference"
for additional witness input, suggesting that the
quality of prosecution would be enhanced by spe-
cial programs aimed at increasing the role of wit-
nesses.
Special unit prosecutors also spent dispropor-
tionately less time on plea negotiations and other
interaction with the opposing counsel. Special unit
prosecutors spent 19% of their combined confer-
ence and telephone time in this manner, relative to
17% to 43% by noncareer criminal attorneys. These
differences are so large that they suggest that spe-
cial unit prosecutors actually spent about the same
amount of absolute time on plea negotiations as
did the attorneys from the regular units despite the
overall heavier expenditure in career criminal
cases. The implication is that special unit attorneys
spent much more time on building cases than they
did on settling them.
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criminal unit invested their time earlier in the life
of a case. As figure 2 illustrates, very little time was
spent early in the life of a routine criminal case;
instead, attorney time was concentrated at the
preliminary hearing. This was in contrast to career
criminal cases, for which the attorney investigated
the case immediately following filing and contin-
ued his preparation throughout the case's life in
municipal court. In superior court, the pattern was
similar. Little time was spent during the first thirty
to sixty days in the life of a routine criminal case,
but for a career criminal case, the attorney input
was immediate and sustained throughout the case's
life in superior court.
Taken together, these findings seem to indicate
that Los Angeles County has been successful in
channeling additional resources into the prosecu-
tion of career criminal cases. Of the resources that
were spent, a greater proportion was devoted to
case preparation, especially to preparation of lay
witnesses. Resources were devoted earlier in the life
of the cases of habitual offenders, and the commit-
ment of resources was sustained throughout the life
of these cases. The question remains open, of
course, whether the application of those resources
improved the prosecution of cases.
RETURNS TO INCREASING PROSECUTIVE RESOURCES
It is extremely difficult to draw inferences con-
was more likely than regular prosecution to secure
a prison sentence. The probability of conviction, of
course, as well as the probability of a prison sen-
tence, depended on more than the expenditure
made on prosecution. Other factors, such as the
seriousness of the offense and the quality of the
evidence pointing toward conviction, were rele-
vant. An attempt to control for some of these
factors was made by holding the following con-
stant: (1) the type of defense counsel; (2) the
number of charges; (3) the number and type of
witnesses; and (4) the elements of the offense, such
as the amount of harm done to persons and the
amount of property loss.
According to the regression results, the fact that
the career criminal unit prosecuted the case did
not have a statistically significant impact on the
probability of conviction. One must be very cau-
tious in drawing a firm conclusion about career
cerning the effectiveness of the career criminal
program. In this section of the report, regression
analysis is used to determine whether the expend-
iture on career criminal cases increased the proba-
bility of conviction and, for convicted cases,
whether prosecution by the career criminal unit
criminal units based on this finding, however. Only
5% of the cases entering the analysis were career
criminal cases. It is always difficult to predict when
so few cases are available for analysis. Additionally,








into the statistical analysis control accurately for
the intrinsic convictability of a case. It could be
that the career criminal cases were more difficult
to prosecute than routine criminal cases and, thus,
that attorneys from the career criminal unit ac-
tually brought marginal cases "up" to convictable
standards. Whatever the explanation, the findings
failed to demonstrate a significant impact on con-
victability of the special handling afforded by the
career criminal unit.
But what about the supplemental investment
made on prosecution? Did additional investment
increase the probability of conviction? According
to the statistical analysis, the probability of convic-
tion actually decreased as the expenditure on a
criminal case increased. Although counterintuitive
at first, this finding has a ready explanation. First,
the most difficult cases probably required the most
expenditure; these were also most likely to be dif-
ficult cases in which to obtain a conviction. Second,
trials are the most expensive means of disposing of
a case and unlike guilty pleas, which are relatively
Attorney time (minutes)
inexpensive, they sometimes result in acquittal. As
a result, it is not unreasonable to expect a negative
correlation between expenditure and conviction.
Third, a strong defense may have caused the pros-
ecutor to increase his expenditure on any given
case, with the effect of holding the probability of
conviction constant, rather than increasing it.
Given the data constraints of this study, it is diffi-
cult to judge the effectiveness of expenditures on
the probability of conviction of career criminal
cases.
Nor was it possible to demonstrate that the
career criminal program enhanced the sentence
received by a convicted offender or that expendi-
ture in general enhanced the sentence. As before,
it is necessary to be cautious about this conclusion.
SUMMARY
It has been shown that career criminal cases
consumed five to seven times as many attorney
hours as the prosecution of routine criminal mat-
ters. It also has been shown that the additional
FIGURE 2
Expenditure of time over the life of career criminal and
routine cases
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hours allowed the prosecutor to develop his case resulted in conviction or the probability that the
earlier in the case life and to sustain his intensive convicted offender received a prison sentence.
involvement over the life of the case. It was not However, data problems dictate caution in using
possible to demonstrate that this increased effort these latter findings to judge the effectiveness of
had an impact on either the probability that a case the prosecution of career criminals.
